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beneficiary of a real property trust.3 ' As a matter of fact, the
proposition would seem to flow rather naturally from the ap-
plicable statutes, and has had, in all probability, a practical, if not
a legal existence for some time in this state.3 2 As well as being
entirely consistent with modern business activity and corporation law
trends, the decision in the instant case is in accord with most
scholarly authorities.3 3 Moreover, it would seem that ability to be
a benficiary may be implied from the power to hold and acquire
property, and need not be specifically granted by the corporate
charter.3 4
X
CRIMINAL LAW - WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL - RIGHT TO WAIVE
HELD QUALIFIED.- Defendant and codefendant were indicted on
two counts of first degree manslaughter, second degree manslaughter,
and conspiracy. The defendant was convicted on two counts of
second degree manslaughter and conspiracy. He appealed from this
conviction, claiming that the denial of his motion for a nonjury
trial was a violation of his absolute right under the New York
Constitution-' to waive a jury trial. In an opinion subsequently
s1 Alcoma Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 682 207 N.Y.S.2d 137, 142
(Sup. Ct. 1960).32 Indeed, this is the theory which is implicit throughout Justice Streit's
discussion of the previous case law, as he indicates that the prior cases were
primarily concerned with violations of the rule against perpetuities, mis-
interpretation of § 96(3), and indefiniteness of beneficiaries. Id. at 680-84, 207
N.Y.S.2d at 140-43.
33 "[In the absence of statutes otherwise providing, a corporation can take
and hold the title to land as well as to personal property, and can be the
beneficiary of a trust either of land or of personalty." 2 SCOT, TRUSTS 819
(2d ed. 1956). IA BoGaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 168, at 118 (1951).
RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 116, comment c (1959): "A corporation,
municipal or private, may be the beneficiary of a trust of property if it has
capacity to take and hold the legal title to such property."
34 See Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 47 Misc. 187, 194,94 N.Y. Supp.
65, 70 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 109 App. Div. 252, 96 N.Y. Supp. 10 (2d Dep't
1905: "[A]II applicable provisions of a general law under which a corpor-
ation has been formed, not expressly set forth in its certificate or articles of
incorporation, are to be read into, and taken to be a part of its charter .... "
Ibid. Consequently, since the New York corporation laws authorize a cor-
poration to hold choses in action, it would seem superfluous to include such
a power in the corporate charter. BALLANTINE, CoRLoiiATioNs § 18, at 62
(rev. ed. 1946).
I N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 2. "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in
the manner to be prescribed by law. The legislature may provide, however,
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division held that
the right is a qualified one within the discretion of the trial judge,
and that it was not an abuse of this discretion to deny the defend-
ant's motion in the absence of a similar waiver by the codefendant
where they were both intimately involved in the commission of the
crimes, and the defendant had made no claim that he was prejudiced
by a joint trial or that he could not receive a fair and impartial ver-
dict. People v. Dias, 10 App. Div. 2d 80, 198 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mnem., 8 N.Y.2d 1061, 170 N.E.2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d
278 (1960).
Although at early common law no direct examples of waiver of
jury trials can be found, there did exist procedural devices which
effected the same results. The defendant, by pleas like "in Gratiam
Reginae," could authorize the court to impose a sentence after
trial if it found that such action was warranted from the facts.2
Early in American history, examples of waiver of jury trial appeared
in the colonies of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland.3 New York,
however, did not follow this example. The leading New York case
is Cancemi v. People,4 where the Court of Appeals refused to accept
the verdict rendered by a jury of eleven in a murder trial where one
juror had withdrawn after trial had begun, even though the de-
fendant had consented to be bound by the determination of the
eleven.5 The court stated: "If a deficiency of one juror might be
waived, there appears to be no good reason why a deficiency of
eleven might not be; and it is difficult to say why, upon the 'same
principle, the entire panel might not be dispensed with, and the trial
committed to the court alone." 6 The court added that the right
by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of thejury in any civil case. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all
criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death, by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court havingjurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact laws, not in-
consistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time of pre-
sentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver."
2Griswold, The Historical Develolment of Waiver of Jury Trial in
Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L. Rv. 655, 659-60 (1934).
3Id. at 660-69.
4 18 N.Y. 128 (1858).5 Even today under the provisions of article I § 2 of the constitution, the
decision in the case would remain the same since the constitution does not
allow waiver where the crime charged is punishable by death. But the
provision denying waiver when the crime is punishable by death did not
come into effect until almost eighty years after the case was decided. N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1937, appendix, p. 2095.
6 Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 138 (1858.). Subsequent cases have
been distinguished from Cancemi. In Pierson v. People, 79 N.Y. 424 (1880),
the defendant, after challenging the jury on the ground that it was improperly
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to a jury trial cannot be dispensed with except by constitutional
amendment.7
In the federal area, a different result was reached with the
decision in Patton v. United States.8 The defendant, who had been
indicted for conspiring to bribe a federal prohibition agent, was tried
in a federal district court, and with the advice of counsel and in
open court, waived trial by twelve jurors and consented to trial by
eleven. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground
that he had no power to waive his constitutional right to trial by
jury. The Supreme Court held that there could be a waiver with
the consent of counsel and the expressed and intelligent consent
of the defendant. The Court added the further requirement that
the waiver must be approved by the trial court:
[T]he duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a
mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to
avoid unreasonable or undue departures from the mode of trial or from any
of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as
the offenses dealt with increase in gravity. 9
Since this right did not evolve from constitutional provisions
as in New York State, 10 it was treated in the federal courts as a
common-law right. It was subsequently codified, and is presently
contained in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure." In a recent case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, relying on the language of the Patton case, interpreted
rule 23(a) as giving the defendant a qualified right, holding that
called, withdrew the challenge. The court stated this waived any irregularities
and distinguished the Cancemi case on the ground that here the error was
merely formal and did not affect public interest. In People v. Cosmo, 205
N.Y. 91, 98 N.E. 408 (1912), the defendant was convicted by a jury of
twelve, one of whom did not meet the proper requirements necessary to
become a juror. The court stated that his failure to challenge the juror at the
trial was a waiver of the objection.
7 Cancemi v. People, supra note 6, at 136. This constitutional guarantee
does not extend to the Courts of Special Sessions. People v. Bellinger, 269
N.Y. 265, 199 N.E. 213 (1935); People v. Luczak, 10 Misc. 590, 32 N.Y.
Supp. 219 (Super. Ct. 1894). The right to a jury trial for the type of
crime triable by a Court of Special Sessions did not exist at the time of the
constitution and thus the constitution did not exend this right to it. People
v. Cleary, 182 Misc. 302, 43 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Utica City Ct. 1943). See also
N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 18 (1926). The defendant may, however, demand
a jury. N.Y. CoDE CRim. PROC. §§ 701-02. In counties other than New York
this is not a constitutional jury of twelve, but rather a statutory jury of six.
N.Y. CoDE CRIm. PRoc. § 710.
s281 U.S. 276 (1929).
9 Id. at 312-13.
10 Cancemi v. People, supra note 6.
11 FFD. R. CRIM. P. 23(a): "Cases required to be tried by jury shall
be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the ap-
proval of the court and the consent of the government."
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the approval of the trial court is not merely ministerial but
discretionary.'2
The New York legislature, in the 1930's, enacted laws to meet
several problems which were arising. In 1933 the Code of Criminal
Procedure was amended to allow alternate jurors,13 thereby al-
leviating the mistrial problem presented in the Cancemi case where
a juror was unable to continue after trial had begun.
In 1937 the Constitution was amended to allow waiver of jury
trial in criminal actions, but this amendment failed to provide for
consent of the court.1 4 The legislature provided for consent in a
1938 amendment. 15 The applicable article now reads:
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except
those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a written
instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before and with
the approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the
offense.' 6
The section is self-executing and independent, needing no other
implementary legislation.17
The question has recently arisen as to whether the right to
waive a jury trial is absolute, i.e., whether it exists only to insure
that the defendant be informed of the serious nature of his act,
reducing the approval of the court to a purely ministerial function,
or whether the right is qualified, the granting or withholding of
which is in the sound discretion of the court. The decisions in other
jurisdictions on this question are of little help, since the problem is
essentially one of statutory interpretation. Some states have con-
strued their statutes as creating a qualified right,I8 some have held
"2 Mason v. United States, 250 F2d 704 (10th Cir. 1957).
"3N.Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 358(a).
'4 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, appendix, p. 2095.
'15 Revised Record, N.Y. State Constitutional Convention of 1938, vol. II,
1273-86.
IS N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). The provision forbidding
waiver in crimes punishable by death was first reported in the 1937 amend-
ment and carried over into this amendment. The decision in the Cancenmi case
that legislative action was needed to allow waiver was finally effectuated but
the legislature expressly denied the right to waive in cases like Cancemi.
17 People v. Carroll, 3 N.Y.2d 686, 148 N.E.2d 875, 171 N.Y.S.2d 812
(1958).
18 People v. Eubanks, 7 Cal. App. 2d 588. 46 P.2d 789 (Dist. Ct. App.
1935) ; Jones v. State. 155 Fla. 588, 20 So. 2d 901 (1945) ; Ex parte Dawson,
20 Idaho 178, 117 Pac. 696 (1911) ; Mitchell v. State, 233 Ind. 16, 115 N.E2d
595 (1935) ; State v. Ricks, 173 Kan. 660, 250 P.2d 773 (1952) ; Common-
wealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N.E. 463 (1935); State v. Pandolfo,
- N.D. -, 98 N.W.2d 161 (1959); State v. Shroyer, 49 N.M. 196, 160
P.2d 444 (1945) ; Morrison v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. 11, 236 Pac. 901 (1925) ;
Commonwealth ex rel. Henderson v. Kruger, 180 Pa. Super. 374, 119 A.2d
870 (1956); State v. Nash, 51 S.C. 319, 28 S.E. 946 (1898); Catlett v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 505, 95 S.E.2d 177 (1956).
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that the right is absolute,19 and others have decisions going both
ways.20 Since in New York the right to waive is a creature of statute
and not of comomn law,21 it would seem that the legislature could, in
creating it, make it qualified. The question is whether in fact they
did So. 22
Prior to the instant case, an aura of confusion surrounded the
sparse New York case law in the area. In, Scott v. McCaffrey,23
the court held the right to be an absolute one. There, a sixteen
year old boy was indicted and tried for first degree assault with
five other defendants. His application for severance was denied,
and he then sought to waive trial by jury. The trial court denied
his application for waiver on the ground that he would thereby be
indirectly accomplishing that which he was unable to accomplish
directly-a severance. The defendant then instituted a proceeding
under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to stay the trial and
compel the trial court to approve his waiver. The Supreme Court
granted the petition and construed the amendment as follows:
It is . . . my view that it was intended by the amendment to provide that,
when the defendant wishes to waive, the only function of the Trial Judge with
respect to this matter is to protect the rights of the defendant, and when
the Judge has ascertained that the defendant is fully aware of the nature and
consequences of his request, and the defendant has signed his written state-
ment in open court before the Judge, approval must follow.2
Shortly after McCaffrey, the case of People v. Masucci 2 5 was
decided in the same county. The defendant was indicted with two
others for conspiracy to commit extortion, and his application for
19 People v. Spegal, 5 Ill. 2d 211, 125 N.E2d 468 (1955); State v. Shall,
177 La. 923, 149 So. 523 (1933); Grady v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 115, 35
S.W.2d 158 (1931).
20 Compare Wadkins v. State, 127 Ga. 45, 56 S.E. 74 (1906) (mis-
demeanor), wit/h Sammons v. State, 53 Ga. App. 369, 185 S.E. 923 (1936)
(misdemeanor), and Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 25 S.E.2d 295 (1943)
(felony). Michigan has held the right qualified in criminal cases, City
of Grand Rapids v. Bateman, 93 Mich. 135, 53 N.W. 6 (1892) (indecent
exposure), and absolute in quasi-criminal proceedings, People v. Martin, 256
Mich. 33, 239 N.W. 341 (1931) (bastardy proceeding). In Ohio the right
has been construed as qualified in Ickes v. State, 63 Ohio St. 549, 59 N.E.
233 (1900) (misdemeanor), and mandatory in State v. Frohner, 150 Ohio St.
53, 80 N.E2d 868 (1948) (murder 1st degree), and State v. Smith, 123 Ohio
St. 237, 174 N.E. 768 (1913) (murder 1st degree).
21 See Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
22 1t is difficult to ascertain what the intent was on this question. The
record of the proceedings offers no answer. See Revised Record, N.Y. State
Constitutional Convention of 1938, vol. II, 1273-86. However, the N.Y.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL FIFTH ANN. REPORT AND STUDIEs, 37, 161-67 (1939),
indicates that the convention intended the right to be qualified.
23 12 Misc. 2d 671, 172 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
24 Id. at 680, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (emphasis added).
2521 Misc. 2d 25, 198 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Bronx County Ct. 1958).
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trial without jury was denied. The court here differed with Scott
v. McCaffrey,26 saying that the court in that case had been in-
fluenced by the youth of the petitioner. This time the court denied
the application for waiver of the jury and decided that all three
defendants should be tried by the jury.
In the instant case, the defendant Diaz, tried with three others
in the First Department, moved for a waiver of trial by jury.
The court denied the waiver and Diaz appealed. The Appellate
Division held that the legislature 2 7 must have intended to give the
trial court discretion, thus making the right a qualified one.28 The
Court drew an analogy to Section 10 of the Membership Corpora-
tion Law, under which approval of a certificate of incorporation by
a justice of the Supreme Court is not a mere ministerial duty, but
calls for the exercise, of judicial discretion. The Court also relied
on the federal rule as established in Mason vz. United States,29
noting the similarity' of the "approval" language in Rule 23(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the language in the
New York Constitution. The Appellate Division also referred to
the fifth annual report of the New York State Judicial Council,
where the committee indicates that, although history favors con-
ferring an untrammelled privilege, the constitutional mandate re-
quires the consent of the court, such consent being a matter of
discretion.30
The decision is of significance to the criminal law practitioner.
It eliminates the right of one codefendant to waive a jury trial if
the other defendants do not also waive, unless he can show some-
thing which would prevent an unprejudiced trial. In this latter
event a tender of waiver would compel the court to approve. Even
26 12 Misc. 2d 671, 172 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
27 See Revised Record, supra note 22.2 8 People v. Diaz, 10 App. Div. 2d 80, 86-87, 198 N.Y.S.2d 27, 34-35, aff'd
ner., 8 N.Y.2d 1061, 170 N.E2d 411, 207 N.Y.S2d 278 (1960). But see the
dissenting opinion which quotes from the Revised Record the statement:
"The proposal is a very simple one. It is intended to protect the rights of the
defendant, to assure him by the necessity for an approval by the judge of full
opportunity to understand what he is doing." Id. at 95, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
29250 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1957).
z0N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL FiFTH ANN. RRPORT AND STUDIES, 37, 161-67
(1939). Subsequent to the Appellate Division decision in the Diaz case
but prior to its affirmation by the Court of Appeals, Duchin v. Peterson,
12 App. Div. 2d 622, 208 N.Y.S.2d 458 (2d Dep't 1960), was decided in the
Second Department holding that a writ of prohibition pursuant to Article
78 of the Civil Practice Act, employed in Scott v. McCaffrey, 12 Misc. 2d
671, 172 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct 1958), was not the proper procedure to
enforce the right to waive, the remedy of appeal being available to the
petitioner. The court did not reach the question of whether the right to waive
was absolute or qualified.
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if the decision is not an "untainted determination," "' the court may
refuse the waiver and grant a severance instead.
Thus the practitioner who could, prior to this decision, under
the Scott v. McCaffrey 2 rule, waive a jury after severance bad
been denied, and thus in reality effect a severance, has lost a
procedural device valuable in separating his client from the others.
It may well be, after this case, that the practioner will find his
client tied to the other defendants with bonds that cannot be broken.
A
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION - APPORTIONMENT - AMOUNT OF
CLAIM BASED ON ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT AND INCLUDIBLE IN THE
GROSS TAx ESTATE HELD SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT.- In a
proceeding to settle their account, the executors of the decedent's
estate sought to have the widow pay her apportioned share of the
estate taxes under Section 124 of the New York Decedent Estate
Law. Decedent and his widow had entered into an antenupital
agreement under the terms of which each mutually waived his rights
in the other's estate, including his right of election. ' As additional
consideration for the contract, the decedent agreed that if the widow
survived him she would be entitled to the remaining annuity pay-
ments due under an agreement between the decedent and his em-
ployer. The widow contended that she was a contract creditor
of the estate and that, as such, no tax could be apportioned against
these annuity payments since they were nontestamentary assets
although they were included in the gross taxable estate. The Court,
applying federal estate tax concepts of consideration, held that this
antenuptial agreement was not a contract which created a legal
obligation exempt from apportionment under section 124, but was in
reality a gift taking effect at death against which there must be
apportionment. Estate of Samuel Lipshie, 145 N.Y.L.J. 15, col.
5 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
Section 124 of the Decedent Estate Law provides for equitable
apportionment of the estate taxes due among all "the persons inter-
ested in the gross tax estate . . . to whom such property is or may
31 People v. Diaz, supra note 28 at 93, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The Court
does not spell out the meaning of this phrase.
32 12 Misc. 2d 671, 172 N.Y.S2d 954 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
1 N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 18. This section provides that when a de-
cedent dies testate, the surviving spouse is entitled to elect his or her share
of the estate as in intestacy subject to certain limitations. There is also
included a provision allowing a Waiver of the right of election.
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